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Supply chains are the backbone of the global economy. Disruptions to them can be costly. Centrally managed
supply chains invest in ensuring their resilience. Decentralized supply chains, however, must rely upon the
self-interest of their individual components to maintain the resilience of the entire chain.
We examine the incentives that independent self-interested agents have in forming a resilient supply chain
network in the face of production disruptions and competition. In our model, competing suppliers are subject
to yield uncertainty (they deliver less than ordered) and congestion (lead time uncertainty or, “soft” supply
caps). Competing retailers must decide which suppliers to link to based on both price and reliability.
In the presence of yield uncertainty only, the resulting supply chain networks are sparse. Retailers con-
centrate their links on a single supplier, counter to the idea that they should mitigate yield uncertainty
by diversifying their supply base. This happens because retailers benefit from supply variance. It suggests
that competition will amplify output uncertainty. When congestion is included as well, the resulting net-
works are denser and resemble the bipartite expander graphs that have been proposed in the supply chain
literature. Finally, we show that a suppliers investments in improved yield can make them worse off. This
happens because high production output saturates the market, which, in turn lowers prices and profits for
participants.
Key words : supply chain, supply chain network, strategic network formation, market clearing, disruptions,
reliability, yield uncertainty, congestion, pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(The most recent version of this paper is available at https://victoramelkin.com/pub/supply-chains/.)
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1. Introduction
Supply chains are the backbone of the global economy. Disruptions to them can be costly.
They happen because the individual components of the chain are subject to yield uncer-
tainty (a supplier comes up short on the ordered product quantity) as well as lead time
uncertainty (clients of overly congested suppliers experience delivery delays) (Snyder et al.
2016). The degree of uncertainty can be large. Bohn and Terwiesch (1999), for example,
suggest that disk drive manufacturer Seagate experiences production yields as low as 50%.
Centrally managed and controlled supply chains invest a great deal in mitigating these
disruptions. Decentralized supply chains, however, must rely upon the self-interest of their
individual components to maintain the resilience of the entire chain.
Cursory reflection suggests that the incentives of an individual component in the chain
should align with the chain as a whole. A supplier, for example, will be rewarded with
greater business if it invests in reducing the possibility of it being disrupted relative to its
competitors. However, a supplier’s customers can also hedge against disruption by multi-
sourcing (Cachon and Terwiesch 2008, Chopra and Meindl 2016, Tomlin 2006). Thus, a
potential customer may prefer to source from many low cost unreliable suppliers rather
than a few highly reliable but costlier suppliers. Cursory reflection also ignores the impact
on output prices that would result from reducing the frequency of disruptions. If prices
adjust to clear markets, increased throughput may result in lower prices. Thus, one must
compare the profits earned from high volumes with low margins with those generated from
lower volumes but with higher margins. It is not obvious which will dominate.
In this paper we examine the strategic formation of a two-tier1 supply chain network by
independent self-interested agents. Retailers occupy the first tier and suppliers the second
tier. The price at which trade takes place between tiers is set to clear the market. Retailers
decide which suppliers to source from. There is also a cost for linking to a supplier.2
Every agent present in the supply chain is subject to yield uncertainty which affects
their capacity.3 It is modeled as a Bernoulli random variable. Yield uncertainty of this kind
can arise from the nature of the production process (e.g., farming); it can also arise from
disruptions like a natural disaster or a union strike. The resulting random output of each
tier is distributed among agents in the downstream tier in proportion to their demands,
following the proportional rationing rule (Rong et al. 2017, Cachon and Lariviere 1999).
Every supplier in the chain is also subject to congestion, and the resulting congestion costs
are borne by the retailers. Congestion in our model has at least two interpretations. One is
a delay cost associated with lead time uncertainty. The second is a “soft” supply constraint.
We are interested in whether a supply chain network resilient to disruptions will form
endogenously in the presence of competition and different types of uncertainty.
The three major findings of our analyses are as follows:
BWith only yield uncertainty and no congestion, retailers create a sparse network, with
a single link per retailer, and concentrate links on a single supplier. This generalizes to
the case of more than two tiers where the corresponding supply chain network is almost a
chain. Link concentration runs counter to the common wisdom about the benefits of multi-
sourcing. Link concentration helps retailers secure low upstream prices in the presence of
1 Our model straightforwardly generalizes to the case of an arbitrary number of tiers.
2 According to Cormican and Cunningham (2007), it takes, on average, six months to a year to qualify a new supplier.
3 To quote Yossi Sheffi: “The essence of most disruptions is a reduction in capacity and, therefore, inability to meet
demand.”
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high upstream yield, and low expenditures in case of the target upstream supplier’s failure.
Therefore, retailers benefit from supply variance. It suggests that competition can amplify
output uncertainty. The network formed in our model is dramatically different from the
ones that are assumed in the existing literature. Bimpikis et al. (2019), for example, assume
that, in the presence of yield uncertainty only, a k-tier supply chain network will take the
form of a complete k-partite graph.
B In the presence of yield uncertainty and congestion, the network formed is sparse,
yet well-connected resembling an expander graph. Similar objects have been shown to
have good resilience properties in the context of centrally organized supply chains, see for
example, Chou et al. (2011). Congestion, unlike yield uncertainty, encourages retailers to
split their demand across several suppliers to lower congestion costs.
B Yield uncertainty and congestion have fundamentally different implications for supply
chains. In the presence of yield uncertainty only, each supplier has a unilateral incentive to
increase its average yield. With both yield uncertainty and congestion, a unilateral reduc-
tion in congestion costs unconditionally benefits that supplier, but increasing mean yield
could make a supplier worse off! This is because high yield results in market saturation,
which leads to low prices and profits for market members.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses prior work.
The subsequent section introduces notation. Sec. 4 describes the model of strategic for-
mation of supply chains with costly links, competition, and yield uncertainty only. Sec. 5
augments the previous model with congestion, and provides its comprehensive character-
ization. Sec. 5.2 focuses on the case of a small two-tier supply chain. Sec. 5.3 provides
a limited set of results for the general two-tier case. Finally, in Sec. 5.4, we describe the
quality-investment behavior of competing heterogeneous suppliers and the qualitative dif-
ferences between yield uncertainty and congestion / lead time uncertainty.
2. Prior Work
Our model has three features:
1. strategic network formation,
2. disruptions, and
3. competition.
In the extensive literature on supply chain networks, one will find models that possess
some, but not all three features, with the exception of one recent model of Amelkin and
Vohra (2019). Table 1 categorizes a sample of recent related works. A detailed comparison
with prior work on network formation in supply chains follows.
There are many papers that study supply chains in the presence of competition. Exam-
ples are Carr and Karmarkar (2005) and Fang and Shou (2015) which use Cournot com-
petition, while Chod et al. (2019) uses Bertrand competition. Some also incorporate dis-
ruptions, such as Deo and Corbett (2009), and Babich et al. (2007). However, none of
considers endogenous network formation.
A significantly smaller set of papers compare supply chain performance across different
network structures, but do not consider endogenous formation. Within this stream two
papers are closely related to ours. The first is Bimpikis et al. (2019). We share the same
price formation process in every tier of the supply chain and the same production model
with Bernoulli yield. Our supply chain network, however, is endogenously formed while
theirs is exogenously fixed to be a complete k-partite graph. Our results cannot be deduced
from the model of Bimpikis et al. (2019). In particular, our analysis in Sec. 4 demonstrates
Amelkin and Vohra: Strategic Formation and Reliability of Supply Chain Networks
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Paper \ Feature Network Formation Disruptions Competition
Present work + + +
Amelkin and Vohra (2019) + + +
Bimpikis et al. (2018) + + −
Ang et al. (2016) + ± −
Tang and Kouvelis (2011) ± + ±
Chod et al. (2019) − ± +
Bimpikis et al. (2019) − + +
Fang and Shou (2015) − + +
Adida and DeMiguel (2011) − + +
Babich et al. (2007) − + +
Carr and Karmarkar (2005) − − +
Bernstein and Federgruen (2005) − + +
Anupindi and Akella (1993) − + −
Kotowski and Leister (2018)* + ± +
Ambrus et al. (2014)* − + −
Deo and Corbett (2009)* − + ±
Kranton and Minehart (2001)* + ± +
Table 1 Prior work summary. Partial presence (±) of disruption means that they are present only in a
part of the system, e.g., in the upstream tier of suppliers (Ang et al. 2016) or the tier of buyers /
retailers (Chod et al. 2019), while in our model every agent can be disrupted. Also, none of the
mentioned works considers anything analogous to our congestion or lead time uncertainty. Absence
(−) of competition implies fixed prices. Works marked with an asterisk are not about supply chains.
that the complete k-partite networks assumed in Bimpikis et al. (2019) need not arise
endogenously in their setting.
The second work is Tang and Kouvelis (2011), with two competing reliable retailers
sourcing from two non-competing suppliers subject to yield uncertainty that is correlated.
Because supplier prices are fixed exogenously, the focus is on how order quantities change
with the sourcing decisions of retailers. This paper compares outcomes across possible
networks, but doesn’t consider all possible networks. In particular, the case when retailers
single-source from the same supplier is excluded. In one of our models, this configuration
arises in equilibrium.
Tang and Kouvelis (2011) also study the effect of an exogenously given correlation
between supplier yields. In our model, supplier yields are independent of each other. How-
ever, when different retailers in our model have overlap in their supplier bases, it results
in an implicit correlation of their production outputs. This implicit correlation influences
network formation in our model.
Papers that consider endogenous supply chain network formation can be numbered on
a single hand. Amelkin and Vohra (2019) consider an endogenous supply chain network
formation model, with yield uncertainty and competition. In their model, suppliers, hav-
ing uncertain i.i.d. supplies, strategically announce wholesale prices to retailers, and the
retailers, then, compete to sell the product to consumers. There are two major differences
between their model and ours. The first difference is in the price formation mechanism:
in our model, in each tier of the supply chain, the market price is formed via market
clearing, in Amelkin and Vohra (2019), suppliers compete with each other by strategically
setting prices. The second difference is that, in Amelkin and Vohra (2019), retailers are
quantity-takers, that is, they have unconstrained demands, while in our model, there is a
specific demand originating at the consumer tier, which, then, “propagates” through the
supply chain network based on how the latter is structured. These two differences produce
different network outcomes in equilibrium. In Amelkin and Vohra (2019) retailers create
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as many links as possible to every “active” supplier, while the link distribution over the
retailers is almost arbitrary, while, in our model, we observe either equilibria networks
with link concentration (see Sec. 4), or the equilibria networks resembling multi-partite
expander graphs (see Sec. 5).
Another work capturing endogenous network formation is Ang et al. (2016), where the
authors consider a supply chain comprised of a manufacturer issuing orders to two sup-
pliers, who, in turn, are also linked to two higher-level suppliers. The manufacturer issues
contracts incorporating quantities and prices, thereby, affecting sourcing decisions of inter-
mediary suppliers. In this model only top-tier suppliers fail, while every agent can fail in
our model. Further, unlike our paper, there is no competition: top-tier sourcing costs—
different for reliable (higher) and unreliable (lower) suppliers—are exogenously fixed; so is
the price at which manufacturer sells a unit of product to consumers.
Ang et al. (2016) are interested in how the intermediate suppliers decide between single-
vs. multi-sourcing decisions. In their paper, the manufacturer, primed by a deterministic
exogenous consumer demand issues price-quantity contracts to the intermediary suppliers,
and each of the intermediaries decides upon how much to order from each of the top-tier
suppliers at the fixed prices. Thus, sourcing decisions of intermediate suppliers in this
paper are the result of strategic price-setting by the manufacturer. In our model, prices
are formed via competition in every tier of the supply chain. Thus, the formed networks
we observe are a result of competition in all tiers.
Ang et al. (2016) characterize optimal sourcing strategies (optimal order quantities) in a
network where intermediaries source from different top-tier suppliers (V-shaped network),
and in the network where they source from the same top-tier supplier (diamond-shaped
network). They also propose and analyze a game where intermediate suppliers strategically
decide upon sourcing from the top tier, and characterize its pure equilibria, which happen to
be the diamond- and V-shaped networks. V-shaped networks are equilibria in our network
formation game as well, but we find other equilibria as well (see Sec. 5.2). It is important
to emphasize that V-shaped equilibria are absent in our model when yield uncertainty is
the only disruption present (see Sec. 4). Hence, if competition was incorporated into Ang
et al. (2016), it would eliminate the V-shaped equilibria.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on strategic network formation, including
the work on buyer-seller networks of Kranton and Minehart (2001), trading networks with
intermediaries of Kotowski and Leister (2018), and risk-sharing networks of Ambrus et al.
(2014). However, the multipartite structure of our networks, the mechanics of our models,
and the conclusions we arrive at are both different and distant from the ones in these
works.
3. Preliminaries and Notation
In this section, we introduce notation (summarize in Table 2) and several useful definitions.
Supply Chain: A supply chain is a multi-tier network comprised of T tiers of agents—
also known as firms or suppliers—where tier t is denoted with Tt = {1,2, . . .}. Most of our
modeling efforts will target 2-tier supply chains, in which T = 2, |T1|= n> 1, |T2|=m> 1.
The agents in tier T1 are referred to as retailers, who sell product to consumers; higher-tier
agents are suppliers. When using notation independent of the total number of tiers, we
may also refer to any agent in any tier of the supply chain as a supplier. Implicitly present
is tier T0 of consumers, and another tier TT+1 corresponding to the raw material market4.
4 The consumer and the raw material producer tiers will actually be represented by a single meta-consumer and
meta-raw material producer, respectively.
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The product will flow from higher numbered tiers (upstream) to lower numbered tiers
(downstream). Throughout this paper, we assume that downstream agents strategically
link to upstream agents in the adjacent tier. All retailers are linked to consumers, and all
top-level suppliers are linked to raw materials producers.
Demands: Each retailer will experience a fixed consumer demand of D= const> 0. By
considering equal consumer demand distribution over the retailers, we make sure that the
retailers differ only in what suppliers they link to. ∆ = nD is the total consumer demand.
More generally, we denote by Dt,i ∈ R+ the demand experienced by agent i∈ Tt, indicating
the amount of product collectively requested from supplier i by downstream agents from
tier Tt−1.
Prices: Each tier T1, . . . ,TT+1 of the supply chain consists of agents competing to supply
agents in the adjacent downstream tier. Within a tier, “supply” is the realized total quantity
present in the tier. The realized quantity may be lower than the demanded quantity due
to upstream production failures. Denote the supply of i ∈ Tt by St,i, and the total supply
of tier Tt by
St =
∑
i∈Tt
St,i. (1)
The market price pt per unit of output of tier t is set so as to “clear” the market, i.e.,
pt = ∆−St. (2)
Production: Each supplier, having received some product quantity, supplies the same
amount of product downstream—provided there are downstream agents linked to this
supplier—with probability λ∈ (0,1), and fails to produce any output with the complemen-
tary probability (1− λ). We exclude λ ∈ {0,1} to avoid trivialities. If λ = 0, the agents
clearly cannot make a profit. Setting λ= 1 entails the same degenerate outcome, the reasons
for which are given in Theorem 2. Raw material producers never fail.
We use Rt,i ∈ R+ to denote the realized demand of supplier i ∈ Tt, that is, how much
supplier i receives from upstream suppliers in Tt+1 in response to i’s demand of Dt,i. The
production success indicator ωt,i ∼Bernoulli(λ) is a random variable that indicates whether
supplier i∈ Tt has succeeded in producing output.
Network: All suppliers together with their links comprise the network underlying the
supply chain. Let N−t,i ⊆ Tt−1 and N+t,i ⊆ Tt+1 denote in- and out-neighborhoods of sup-
plier i ∈ Tt, that is, the sets of suppliers that source product from i or that i sources
product from, respectively. Thus, the network formed by suppliers of tier Tt is gt =
(N+t,1, . . . ,N
+
t,nt), with g = g1 being used in the analysis of two-tier chains. We also define
g−it = (N
+
t,1, . . . ,N
+
t,i−1,N
+
t,i+1, . . .N
+
t,nt), and g
−i = g−i1 for two-tier chains. In- and out-degrees
of i are d−t,i = |N−t,i| and d+t,i = |N+t,i|, respectively. d+i∩i′ = |N+t,i ∩N+t,i′| stands for the size of
out-neighborhood overlap of suppliers i, i′ ∈ Tt. Additionally, we introduce the effective
out-degree e+t,i =
∑
j∈N+t,i ωt+1,j of supplier i ∈ Tt, that measures the number of its out-
neighbors who successfully produced output. We will say that a supplier is active if its in-
and out-degrees are both positive; other suppliers are inactive (and they cannot possibly
earn profits due to their inability to either buy or sell). By Tat ⊆ Tt we will denote the
subset of active suppliers of tier Tt, and the number of active suppliers is nat = |Tat |.
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Finally, we introduce the following expressions useful in the analysis of our models:
ρ+t,i =
∑
i′∈Tat {i}
d+i∩i′
d+t,i′
=
∑
i′∈Tat {i}
|N+t,i′ ∩N+t,i|
d+t,i′
, (3)
Ft,j =
∑
i∈N−t,j {i}
1
d+t−1,i
, (4)
F−it,j =
∑
i′∈N−t,j {i}
1
d+
t−1,i′
. (5)
Here, ρ+t,i measures the aggregate relative extent to which out-neighborhoods of active
suppliers in tier Tt overlap with the out-neighborhood of supplier i, or, less formally,
how well supplier i is “embedded” in its tier. Thus, we will refer to ρ+ as the degree of
overlap of i with its peer suppliers. As suppliers distribute their demand uniformly over out-
neighborhoods, Ft,j quantifies (scaled) congestion at supplier j ∈ Tt (where “congestion”
is understood with respect to the demand coming from downstream agents), and F−it,j
measures the same quantity excluding the impact of supplier i. Seemingly different, ρ+t,i
and F−it+1,j are actually closely related, as shown in the next Lemma.
Lemma 1 (About ρ+t,i and F
−i
t+1,j).
ρ+t,i =
∑
j∈N+t,i
F−it+1,j.
Proof of Lemma 1:
ρ+t,i =
∑
i′∈Tat {i}
d+i∩i′
d+t,i′
=
∑
i′∈Tat {i}
|N+t,i′ ∩N+t,i|
d+t,i′
=
∑
i′∈Tat {i}
∑
j∈N+
t,i′∩N
+
t,i
1
d+t,i′
=
∑
i→j←i′ 6=i
1
d+t,i′
=
∑
j∈N+t,i
∑
i′∈N−t+1,j {i}
1
d+t,i′
=
∑
j∈N+t,i
F−it+1,j.

When dealing with two-tier supply chains, we call the underlying network left-regular
if all retailers have identical out-degrees, and right-regular if all suppliers have identical
in-degrees.
We restrict attention to pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
4. Strategic Formation of Supply Chain Networks Without Congestion
In this section, we consider a supply chain model, similar to Bimpikis et al. (2019), aug-
mented with strategic link formation. Our equilibrium networks will differ from the net-
works exogenously imposed in Bimpikis et al. (2019).
At a high-level, the two-tier version of our model is as follows. In a supply chain, con-
sumers and raw material producers are connected via two tiers—retailers (linked to con-
sumers) and suppliers (linked to the raw material producers). Only retailers are strategic
Amelkin and Vohra: Strategic Formation and Reliability of Supply Chain Networks
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Tt {1, . . . , nt} – tier t∈ {1, . . . , T} of the supply chain; |T1|= n, |TT |=m, |Tt = nt|
Dt,i demand exerted upon supplier i∈ Tt by downstream suppliers from Tt−1
D D1,i = const – consumer demand per retailer
Rt,i realized demand of supplier i∈ Tt; Rt,i ≤Dt,i
∆ nD – total consumer demand
St,i supply delivered by supplier i∈ Tt to downstream suppliers sourcing from i
St
∑
i∈Tt St,i – total supply of tier Tt
ωt,i ωt,i ∼Bernoulli(λ) – production success indicator of supplier i∈ Tt
λ P{ωt,i = 1} ∈ (0,1) – production success likelihood
N+t,i N
+
t,i ⊆ Tt+1 – out-neighborhood of supplier i∈ Tt; (N−t,i ⊆ Tt−1 – in-neighborhood)
gt (N
+
t,1, . . . ,N
+
t,nt) – network between tiers Tt and Tt+1; when T = 2, g= g1
d+t,i |N+t,i| – out-degree of supplier i∈ Tt; (d−t,i – in-degree)
d+t,i∩i′ |N+t,i ∩N+t,i′ | – number of out-neighbors that i, i′ ∈ Tt share
e+t,i
∑
j∈N+
t,i
ωt+1,j – effective out-degree of supplier i∈ Tt; (e−t,i – effective in-degree)
Tat {i∈ Tt | d−t,id+t,i > 0} – subset of active suppliers in tier Tt
nat |Tat | – number of active suppliers in tier Tt; 0≤ nat ≤ nt
pt market price of a unit of product at which tier Tt sells downstream
ρ+t,i aggregate relative extent of overlap of out-neighborhoods in Tt with N
+
t,i
Ft,j congestion at supplier j ∈ Tt
F−it,j Ft,j excluding the contribution of i∈ Tt−1
c constant cost of linking to an upstream supplier
γ constant congestion cost
pit,i payoff of supplier i∈ Tt
Table 2 Notation summary.
in that they (i) plan what price per unit of product to announce to consumers; as well
as (ii) decide which suppliers to source product from. In each tier of the supply chain,
prices are determined via market clearing. When planning, retailers take into account
production failures that may occur at any agent present in the system. Retailers pay a
constant cost for each link they create. Each supplier is capable of delivering any amount
of product—conditional upon production success in the chain—regardless of the collective
demand retailers exert upon it.
4.1. Model Without Congestion
Let us consider a two-tier (T = 2) supply chain model—illustrated in Fig. 1—in which tier
T1 consists of n retailers, all linked to consumers, tier T2 consists of m suppliers, all linked
to raw material producers. It is up to the retailers in T1 to decide which suppliers in T2 to
link to.
4.1.1. Demands Demand in the supply chain originates in the consumer tier, and,
propagates up the chain. Retailers choose prices. As they are undifferentiated, it is assumed
that under competition they end up announcing identical prices pc. Assuming a linear
inverse demand curve, D1,i = D =
∆−pc
n
is the consumer demand per retailer. Consumer
demand across retailers is equal consistent with the absence of differentiation.
Each agent i ∈ Tt allocates its demand Dt,i equally among its out-neighborhood. Thus,
each upstream agent in i’s out-neighborhood receives an order for Dt,i/d
+
t,i units (which is
true even for consumers, as long as tier T0 is represented by a single meta-consumer, with
Amelkin and Vohra: Strategic Formation and Reliability of Supply Chain Networks
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Figure 1 Two-tier supply chain with n retailers, m suppliers, and two implicitly present tiers of consumers and
raw material producers. Links are directed from downstream to upstream agents, and appear only between
adjacent tiers.
demand nD), so the demand of a supplier j in tier T2 is
D2,j =
∑
i∈N−2,j
D1,i
d+1,i
=D
∑
i∈N−2,j
1
d+1,i
, (6)
where N−2,j is the in-neighborhood of supplier j ∈ T2, and d+1,i is the out-degree of retailer
i∈ T1; or, more generally,
Dt,j =
∑
i∈N−t,j
Dt−1,i
d+t−1,i
. (7)
Agent i∈ Tt, experiencing demand Dt,i, orders that exact amount of product upstream. An
agent could order more than this to mitigate the uncertainty with upstream supply, but
we rule this out to see more clearly the role of multi-sourcing in mitigating supply chain
disruptions.
The demand formation process just described is equivalent to Bimpikis et al. (2019) who
“prime” the supply chain with a fixed price for raw materials. Under the market clearing
assumption this converts into demand for raw materials, and the latter propagates through
the supply chain. In our model, demand propagates in the opposite direction—from the
consumers towards the raw material producers.
4.1.2. Production, Failures, and Supplies Having received up to Dt,i units of product
from upstream, agent i passes all it receives from the upstream tier to the downstream
tier with production success probability λ∈ (0,1), or fails to do so with the complementary
probability (1− λ).
To analyze production failures, we introduce random variables ωt,i ∼ Bernoulli(λ)—
production success indicators—indicating whether production at agent i ∈ Tt succeeds.
Production failures at different suppliers are independent, so ωt,i are i.i.d. Using these
random variables, we define realized demand Rt,i of agent i ∈ Tt—the amount of product
delivered to this agent by upstream suppliers in response to its demand Dt,i and along its
out-links N+t,i—where each supplier allocates its available product (whose quantity may be
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lower than the one requested from the supplier due to disruptions) over its downstream
agents proportionally5 to the latters’ demands:
Rt,i =
∑
j∈N+t,i
(
ωt+1,j
Rt+1,j
Dt+1,j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
produced share of
supply of j ∈ Tt+1
Dt,i
d+t,i︸︷︷︸
amount i
requested
from j
, (8)
R2,j =D2,j, (9)
where the second expression implies never-failing raw material producers in the two-tier
model. Substituting (9) into (8), we get the realized amount that a retailer receives is
R1,i =D
∑
j∈N+1,i ω2,j
d+1,i
=D
e+1,i
d+1,i
, (10)
where
e+1,i =
∑
j∈N+1,i
ω2,j (11)
is the effective out-degree of i, that is, the number of i’s out-neighbors whose production
succeeded. We define supply St,i of agent i∈ Tt to its downstream customers as
St,i = ωt,iRt,i. (12)
Market clearing at every pair of adjacent tiers of the supply chain translates into the
following equality
St+1 =
( ∑
j∈Tt+1
St+1,j
)
=
∑
i∈Tt
Rt,i, (13)
that is, we assume that the entire amount of product St+1 supplied by the upstream
suppliers j ∈ Tt+1 is consumed by downstream suppliers i∈ Tt, as expressed via
∑
iRt,i.
4.1.3. Payoffs The payoff pit,i of agent i∈ Tt is as follows:
pit,i = St,i · pt︸ ︷︷ ︸
selling
downstream
− Rt,i · pt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
buying
upstream
− c · d+t,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
linking
cost
, (14)
piT,i = ST,i · pT −RT,i · pT+1, (15)
where c≥ 0 is a fixed linking cost, and
pt = ∆−St (2)
is the market price in tier Tt being a function of the total output St of that tier (pT+1 is
the market price of raw materials). This cost can be interpreted as the expense a retailer
5 Proportional allocation is a widely used scheme; for justification, see, for example Rong et al. (2017)
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incur to establish a relationship with a new supplier. In a two-tier model, suppliers are not
strategic6 and, hence, do not pay for their links to the raw material producers. From (14), it
is clear that an agent’s payoff depends upon how agents are interlinked, how much product
agent i requests from upstream suppliers, as well as the random production failures.
The price formation mechanism in (2) implies that every active supplier in tier Tt con-
tributes to the tier’s output St and, hence, to the market price pt. This can be justified by
assuming that negotiations happen ex ante, without any pre-existing relationships between
buyers and sellers. A link corresponds to an underlying agreement to buy up to a cer-
tain quantity of product at the (initially unknown) market price, which will be realized
after production failures. This can be implemented, for example, through a price-matching
clause in the contract, based on which suppliers would be discouraged to deviate from the
market price, thereby (and due to the complete information assumption) establishing a
single market price for the whole market.
4.1.4. Network Formation Game Without Congestion The major qualitative differ-
ence between our model without congestion from the model considered in Bimpikis et al.
(2019) is that the agents in our model are allowed to choose their links. We model the
agents’ link formation behavior as a one-shot network formation game. We describe the
game for the two-tier model but it generalizes to the multi-tier case.
Definition 1 (Strategic Network Formation Game Without Congestion).
In a two-tier supply chain, every retailer is considered a player, with payoff (14), and
whose pure strategy is its out-neighborhood N+1,i, that is, which upstream suppliers in T2 to
link to. The retailers (or, all the strategic agents in tiers 1, . . . , T −1 in the multi-tier case)
simultaneously decide upon their pure strategies, rationally maximizing their expected
payoffs.
We will be interested in pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game, defined with respect
to arbitrary unilateral deviations in a standard fashion as follows.
Definition 2 (Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium). g∗ = (N+1,i
∗
)i∈T1 is a pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium of the network formation game without congestion if for any retailer
i∈ T1 and for any N+1,i, it holds that
E[pi1,i(N
+
1,i, (N
+
1,i′
∗
)i′∈T1 {i})]≤ E[pi1,i(g∗)].
Throughout this work, whenever we refer to an equilibrium, we mean pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
4.2. Analysis
In this section we characterize the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the network formation
game without congestion.
4.2.1. Expected Payoffs The first step in the analysis is to obtain the expected payoff
of a retailer, based on equation (15).
Proposition 1 (Retailer’s Expected Payoff). For an active retailer i∈ T1 (having
d+1,i > 0),
E[pi1,i] = λ(1− λ)D(λD((1 + λ)na1− λ)−∆) + λ(1− λ)2D2
1 + (1 + λ)ρ+1,i
d+1,i
− cd+1,i, (16)
6 In Sec. 5.4 we allow suppliers to invest in their reliability.
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where λ is the production success likelihood, D is the consumer demand per retailer, na1 ≤ n
is the number of active retailers in tier T1, ∆ = nD is the total consumer demand, and
ρ+1,i =
∑
i′∈T1 {i}
d+1,i′∩i / d
+
1,i′ =
∑
i′∈T1 {i}
|N+1,i ∩N+1,i′| / d+1,i′
measures the extent of overlap between the out-neighborhood of retailer i and those of i’s
peers i′ ∈ T1, i′ 6= i. For a retailer i having no out-links, E[pi1,i] = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1: From equation (14), we have
pi1,i = S1,ip1−R1,ip2− cd+1,i = (from (12) and (2)) = ω1,iR1,i(∆−S1)−R1,i(∆−S2)− cd+1,i
= (from (1) and (13)) = ω1,iR1,i(∆−
∑
i′∈Ta1
ω1,i′R1,i′)−R1,i(∆−
∑
i′∈Ta1
R1,i′)− cd+1,i
=R1,i
(∑
i′∈Ta1
(1−ω1,iω1,i′)R1,i′ − (1−ω1,i)∆
)
− cd+1,i,
where Ta1 ⊆ T1 is a subset of active retailers that have at least one out-link each. To compute
expectation of the obtained expression for pi1,i, let us first compute expectations of its
components.
E[R1,i] = (from (10)) = E
[
D
e+1,i
d+1,i
]
=
D
d+1,i
E[e+1,i] = (from (11)) =
D
d+1,i
E
[ ∑
j∈N+1,i
ω2,j
]
=
D
d+1,i
∑
j∈N+1,i
E[ω2,j] =
D
d+1,i
∑
j∈N+1,i
λ=
D
d+1,i
λd+1,i = λD.
E[R1,iR1,i′] = (from (10)) = E
[(
D
e+1,i
d+1,i
)(
D
e+1,i′
d+1,i′
)]
=
D2
d+1,id
+
1,i′
E[e+1,ie
+
1,i′ ]
=
D2
d+1,id
+
1,i′
E
[( ∑
j∈N+1,i
ω2,j
)( ∑
j′∈N+
1,i′
ω2,j′
)]
= (as ωt,i are i.i.d., and E[X
2] = E2[X] + Var[X])
=
D2
d+1,id
+
1,i′
( ∑
j∈N+1,i
∑
j′∈N+
1,i′
E[ω2,j]E[ω2,j′] +
∑
j∈N+1,i∩N+1,i′
Var[ω2,j]
)
=
D2
d+1,id
+
1,i′
( ∑
j∈N+1,i
∑
j′∈N+
1,i′
λ2 +
∑
j∈N+1,i∩N+1,i′
λ(1− λ)
)
=
D2
d+1,id
+
1,i′
(
λ2d+1,id
+
1,i′ + λ(1− λ)d+1,i∩i′
)
= λD2
(
λ+
1− λ
d+1,i
· d
+
1,i∩i′
d+1,i′
)
,
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where d+1,i∩i′ = |N+1,i ∩N+1,i′|. In particular, when i′ = i,
E[R21,i] = λD
2
(
λ+
1− λ
d+1,i
· d
+
1,i∩i
d+1,i
)
= λD2
(
λ+
1− λ
d+1,i
· d
+
1,i
d+1,i
)
= λD2
(
λ+
1− λ
d+1,i
)
.
Having computed expectations of expressions involving realized demands, we can now
return to the computation of expectation of retailer payoff.
E[pi1,i] = E
[
R1,i
(∑
i′∈Ta1
(1−ω1,iω1,i′)R1,i′ − (1−ω1,i)∆
)
− cd+1,i
]
= (as ωt,i and Rt+1,j are indep.)
= (1−E[ω21,i])E[R21,i] +
∑
i′∈Ta1 ,i′ 6=i
(1−E[ω1,iω1,i′ ])E[R1,iR1,i′ ]−∆(1−E[ω1,i])E[R1,i]− cd+1,i
= (1− λ)λD2
(
λ+
1− λ
d+1,i
)
+ (1− λ2)
∑
i′∈Ta1 ,i′ 6=i
λD2
(
λ+
1− λ
d+1,i
· d
+
1,i∩i′
d+1,i′
)
−∆(1− λ)λD− cd+1,i
= λ2D2(1− λ) + λ(1− λ)
2D2
d+1,i
+ λ2(1− λ2)D2(|Ta1| − 1)
+
λ(1− λ)(1− λ2)D2
d+1,i
∑
i′∈Ta1 {i}
d+1,i′∩i
d+1,i′
− λ(1− λ)∆D− cd+1,i
= λ2D2(1− λ) + λ(1− λ)
2D2
d+1,i
+ λ2(1− λ2)D2(na1− 1) +
λ(1− λ)(1− λ2)D2
d+1,i
ρ+1,i
− λ(1− λ)∆D− cd+1,i
= λ(1− λ)D(λD((1 + λ)na1− λ)−∆) + λ(1− λ2)D2
1 + (1 + λ)ρ+1,i
d+1,i
− cd+1,i.

4.2.2. Bounding Costs To prevent trivial equilibrium outcomes such as an empty net-
work, we need to ensure that costs are not excessive.
Assumption 1 (Bounding Costs for Network Formation Without Congestion).
If the number of suppliers is at least as large as the number of retailers, that is, m ≥ n,
then, the network with parallel links—in which every retailer maintains a single link,
pointing to an exclusive supplier yields each retailer positive expected payoff.
Assumption 1 states that the model’s parameters are such that the network with parallel
links—illustrated in Fig. 2—is at least as good as the empty network. This network is
the simplest and least cost—from the point of view of link maintenance cost—network in
which retailers can turn a profit.
Proposition 2 (Bounding Costs in the Model Without Congestion). For the
model without congestion, Assumption 1 holds if and only if
c < λ(1− λ)(n− 1)(λ2 + λ− 1)D2, (17)
λ>
√
5− 1
2
≈ 0.618. (18)
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Figure 2 A network with parallel links. Model’s parameters are assumed to be bounded, so that in such a
network, if m≥ n, every retailer would earn positive expected payoff.
Proof of Proposition 2: From Proposition 1, we know that the expected retailer payoff
in a network with parallel links and enough suppliers (m ≥ n)—shown in Fig. 2—is as
follows.
E[pi1,i] = λ(1− λ)D(λD((1 + λ)na1− λ)−∆) + λ(1− λ)2D2
1 + (1 + λ)ρ+1,i
d+1,i
− cd+1,i
= λ(1− λ)D(λD((1 + λ)n− λ)−∆) + λ(1− λ)
2D2
1
− c · 1
=D2 · λ(1− λ)((n− 1)λ2 + (n− 1)λ+ 1)−D · λ(1− λ)∆− c
= (∆ = nD) = λ(1− λ)(n− 1)(λ2 + λ− 1)D2− c.
The proposition statement’s requirement E[pi1,i]≥ 0 immediately translates into the upper
bound for the linking cost
c < λ(1− λ)(n− 1)(λ2 + λ− 1)D2.
For this upper bound to be well-defined, however, it must be non-negative, since c≥ 0. It
is non-negative as long as λ2 + λ− 1≥ 0, which holds iff λ∈ (
√
5−1
2
,1).

4.2.3. Nash Equilibria Characterization In our analysis of equilibria, we will first deal
with an empty network equilibrium. While such a network itself is not of particular interest
to us, its being an equilibrium provides useful insights into the model without congestion
and the impact of the presence of multiple active retailers upon the latters’ profit-making.
Theorem 1 (Empty Equilibrium Existence). If the linking cost c > 0, then an
empty network is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the network formation game without
congestion.
Proof of Theorem 1: From (14), we know
pit,i = St,i · pt︸ ︷︷ ︸
selling
downstream
− Rt,i · pt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
buying
upstream
− c · d+t,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
linking
cost
.
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When only one retailer i∈ T1 is active, d+1,i > 0, while all its peers have no links,
p1 = (from (2)) = ∆−S1 = (from (1)) = ∆−S1,i = (from (12)) = ∆−ω1,iR1,i,
p2 = (from (2)) = ∆−S2 = (from (13)) = ∆−R1,i,
so,
pi1,i = S1,i · p1−R1,i · p2− c · d+1,i = ω1,iR1,i(∆−ω1,iR1,i)−R1,i(∆−R1,i)− cd+1,i
≤R1,i(∆−R1,i)−R1,i(∆−R1,i)− cd+1,i =−cd+1,i < 0
as long as d+1,i > 0. Hence, no retailer would prefer to unilaterally deviate from an empty
network, making it an equilibrium. 
In words, Theorem 1 states that a single active retailer cannot create and exploit a gap
between upstream and downstream prices if no other active retailers are in the market. It
is useful to note that a similar effect is present when there are multiple active retailers and
no production failures, as Theorem 2 states.
Theorem 2 (Empty Equilibrium Uniqueness When Nobody Fails). If produc-
tion never fails, that is, λ = 1, and c > 0, then, the empty network is the unique equilib-
rium of the network formation game without congestion (while the corresponding consumer
demand D per retailer is arbitrary).
Proof of Theorem 2: If λ = 1, the expected payoff of a retailer having positive out-
degree d+1,i > 0 is as follows:
pi1,i = S1,i · p1−R1,i · p2− c · d+1,i = (from (2)) = S1,i · (∆−S1)−R1,i · (∆−S2)− c · d+1,i
= (from (12)) = ω1,iR1,i · (∆−S1)−R1,i · (∆−S2)− c · d+1,i = (since no failures)
=R1,i · (∆−na1D)−R1,i · (∆−na1D)− c · d+1,i =−cd+1,i < 0.
Thus, a retailer cannot have a positive out-degree at an equilibrium, making the empty
network—which is an equilibrium as per Theorem 1—a unique equilibrium. 
Theorem 2 easily generalizes to a supply chain with an arbitrary number T ≥ 2 of tiers.
Theorem 2 states that production failures are essential for the agents’ ability to make
positive profit in the model. The latter is the result of price formation through competition
under market clearance, as well as due to our stipulation that the agents function as
“repeaters”, at best reproducing the input quantity, and not actually transforming the
product and/or adding any value to it.
From now on we will be interested in non-trivial equilibria. In the following Theorem 3,
we characterize non-trivial equilibria of the supply chain network formation game without
congestion. The networks from these equilibria are illustrated in Fig. 3.
Theorem 3 (Non-empty Equilibria Characterization). In the supply chain net-
work formation game without congestion (Definition 1), under Assumption 1, if c > 0, then
a cone network—in which every retailer i∈ T1 maintains a single link, and all the retailers
link to the same upstream supplier—is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This is a unique
non-empty equilibrium of the game, up to supplier labeling.
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Figure 3 Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in supply chain network formation game without congestion.
Proof of Theorem 3 We first show that under the assumptions about the linking cost,
cone networks are Nash equilibria, and, then, show their uniqueness.
1) Cone networks are equilibria: Consider one such network—as shown in Fig. 3—where
all the retailers maintain a single link each, linking to the same supplier. From (16), the
expected payoff of retailer i is
E[pi1,i] = λ(1− λ)D(λD((1 + λ)na1− λ)−∆) + λ(1− λ)2D2
1 + (1 + λ)ρ+1,i
d+1,i
− cd+1,i.
In a cone network, in the expression above,
na1 = n, d
+
1,i = 1, ρ
+
1,i =
∑
i′∈Ta1 {i}
d+1,i′∩i
d+1,i′
=
∑
i′∈Ta1 {i}
1 = na1− 1 = n− 1,
so, in such a network,
E[pi1,i] = λ(1− λ)D(λD((1 + λ)n− λ)−nD) + λ(1− λ)2D2(1 + (1 + λ)(n− 1))− c
= λ(1− λ)((1 + λ)n− λ)D2− λ(1− λ)D2n− c
= λ2(1− λ)(n− 1)D2− c.
This is non-negative as long as
c≤ λ2(1− λ)(n− 1)D2.
Simultaneously, we have an upper bound (16) on c from Proposition 2, coming from the
assumption about the feasibility of a network with parallel links
c < λ(1− λ)(n− 1)(λ2 + λ− 1)D2
that holds in the considered region λ∈ (
√
5−1
2
,1). The latter bound on c is tighter for such
λ than the former one, so, under Assumption 1, for the considered network we have
E[pi1,i]> 0.
It is also clear that no agent strictly prefers to unilaterally deviate from that network: (i)
by dropping a link, a retailer would change its positive expected payoff to zero expected
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payoff; (ii.a) ρ+1,i is already at its maximum (i’s out-neighborhood completely overlaps with
that of each of its peers, of all whom are active) and cannot be improved; and (ii.b) E[pi1,i]
is strictly decreasing in d+1,i. Consequently, the considered network is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
2) Cone networks are the only equilibria: Now, we show that the cone networks—each
corresponding to a different supplier j ∈ T2 to whom every retailer links—are unique.
From Assumption 1 it is clear that if some—but not all—retailers have no links, the
corresponding network is not an equilibrium—by assumption, these retailers would earn
positive profit by maintaining a single link having no out-neighborhood overlap with other
retailers; in an arbitrary network (rather than a network with parallel links and sufficiently
many suppliers), the overlap can only increase a retailer’s expected payoff. Thus, we are
only concerned with proving that networks where every retailer is active are not equilibria
unless it is a cone network.
Now, assume a network, where every retailer is active, ∀i ∈ T1 : d+1,i > 0, yet the retailer
degree sequence is non-uniform. We show that for a retailer i such that d+1,i > 1, one can
always find a link in N+1,i to drop which would be strictly beneficial to i. Assume that
retailer i is considering dropping a link to upstream supplier k ∈N+1,i; the payoff and the
corresponding neighborhood overlap after the link is dropped are denoted by pi1,i and ρ˜
+
1,i,
respectively. Then,
E[pi1,i−pi1,i]
=
[
λ(1− λ)2D2 1 + (1 + λ)ρ˜
+
1,i
d+1,i− 1
− c(d+1,i− 1)
]
−
[
λ(1− λ)2D2 1 + (1 + λ)ρ
+
1,i
d+1,i
− cd+1,i
]
=
λ(1− λ)2D2
d+1,i(d
+
1,i− 1)
− λ(1− λ)(1− λ2)D2
(
ρ˜+1,i
d+1,i− 1
− ρ
+
1,i
d+1,i
)
+ c
= λ(1− λ)2D2 1 + (1 + λ)(d
+
1,i(ρ˜
+
1,i− ρ+1,i) + ρ+1,i)
d+1,i(d
+
1,i− 1)
+ c.
Let us take a closer look at one component of the obtained expression:
d+1,i(ρ˜
+
1,i− ρ+1,i) + ρ+1,i = (from Lemma 1) = d+1,i(
∑
j∈N+1,i {k}
F−i2,j − ρ+1,i) + ρ+1,i
= d+1,i((ρ
+
1,i−F−i2,k)− ρ+1,i) + ρ+1,i = ρ+1,i−F−i2,kd+1,i = d+1,i
(
ρ+1,i
d+1,i
−F−i2,k
)
= (from Lemma 1) = d+1,i
∑j∈N+1,i F−i2,j
d+1,i
−F−i2,k
= d+1,i(〈F−i2,j 〉j∈N+1,i −F−i2,k),
where F−i2,j =
∑
i′∈N−2,j {i} 1/d
+
1,i′. Taking into account that k ∈N+1,i, in the obtained expression
we are subtracting one F−i2,k from its arithmetic average per retailer i. It is clear that we
can always pick k = arg minj F
−i
2,j to make the obtained expression non-negative. Thus,
d+1,i(ρ˜
+
1,i − ρ+1,i) + ρ+1,i ≥ 0, and consequently, E[pi1,i − pi1,i] > 0 for such k. In other words,
Amelkin and Vohra: Strategic Formation and Reliability of Supply Chain Networks
(Working Paper, September 19, 2019) 19
an arbitrarily picked retailer with out-degree exceeding 1 has a strict incentive to drop a
link to its “least useful” supplier. Hence, for any non-cone network there is a sequence of
strictly improving unilateral deviations that terminate in a cone network. 
Theorem 3 generalizes easily to the T -tier case and is summarized in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 (Non-Empty Equilibria in T -tier Supply Chain). In a T -tier
supply chain network formation game without congestion, the networks illustrated
in Fig. 4—in which T1 retailers concentrate links, and in each subsequent tier Tt,
t∈ {2, . . . , T}, only one active supplier maintains a single link—are the unique non-empty
pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Figure 4 Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in multi-tier supply chain network formation game without congestion.
Thus, in the absence of congestion equilibrium supply chains are almost chains, up to the
linkage between the first two tiers T1 and T2. From this corollary, it is clear why in Bimpikis
et al. (2019), among the exogenously given complete k-partite supply chain networks, the
inverted pyramid-shaped networks—with the number of agents per tier decreasing along
the supply chain—appear as optimal.
4.3. Discussion of the Model Without Congestion
The analysis in Sec. 4.2 of the model of Sec. 4.1 produced cone-shaped non-empty equilibria
networks, in which the retailers, have one link each, point to the same supplier upstream.
The sparsity of such networks as well as the link concentration behavior are surprising.
Intuitively, one would expect a resilient / efficient network would have some link redun-
dancy. It is also surprising that too high production reliability, i.e., λ large, can actually
hurt retailers; in particular, there is no way retailers can make a profit if production never
fails. We discuss these observations below.
4.3.1. Sparsity Equilibrium networks are sparse because there are no bounds on sup-
plies. Each upstream supplier can produce as much product as requested (conditional upon
production success at that supplier, and, possibly, at other higher-level suppliers in a multi-
tier model). The consequence of this is easy to see in a simplified model where we remove
price formation and focus only quantities: assume that a single retailer needs to satisfy a
demand of D units, and has an option to source it from d+1,i upstream suppliers (d
+
1,i/D
units from each) each of whom successfully delivers the requested quantity with a fixed
probability λ. Ignoring the cost of link formation, the expected payoff of the retailer is
λD. Hence, it does not matter through how many links to source product, even in the
presence of failure. As soon as we introduce a positive linking cost, the retailer prefers to
source product via a single link. If, instead, each upstream supplier had a hard cap on its
production output strictly lower that a retailer’s demand D, retailers would be forced to
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multi-source. Our model with congestion—described in Sec. 5—incorporates a soft cap via
a congestion penalty.
4.3.2. Link Concentration Retailers favor link concentration as sourcing from a sin-
gle supplier allows them to buy at a low upstream price (conditional upon that supplier
successfully producing). The positive effect of link concentration by the retailers is best
illustrated with a simple example. Consider a supply chain, with two retailers 1 and 2 and
two suppliers A and B, in which we are concerned with the expected payoff of retailer 1.
For simplicity, suppose D = 1 and c= 0 (the introduction of linking costs does not affect
the conclusion). Now, let us compare the link concentration scenario (cone network) with
the scenario when the retailers source from separate suppliers (network with parallel links).
• Cone Network: If both retailers source from the same supplier, say, A, the upstream
price is always low (0 in this example) when upstream production succeeds, and the
positive expected payoff of retailer 1 is obtained entirely from the case when both
retailer 1 and the supplier A succeed, while retailer 2 fails, thereby, creating a 1
unit gap between upstream and downstream prices, generating a payoff pi1,1 = 1, with
probability λ2(1− λ).
• Network with Parallel Links: If the retailers source from different suppliers, then, the
expected payoff of retailer 1 has two components. One when 1 succeeds, its peer 2
fails, and both upstream suppliers succeed establishing a low upstream price—which
happens with probability λ3(1− λ), and in which retailer 1 has a payoff pi1,1 = 1. The
other case is when 1 fails, yet, its supplier A succeeds (so 1 does not sell to consumers,
yet has to buy from A), and B fails (so 1 buys at a high upstream price of 1), which
happens with likelihood λ(1− λ)2 and corresponds to 1’s payoff pi1,1 =−1. Hence, the
expected payoff of retailer 1 in the network with parallel links is λ3(1−λ)−λ(1−λ)2 =
λ(1− λ)(λ2 + λ− 1)< λ2(1− λ) for all λ∈ (0,1).
The benefit that retailers enjoy from supply variance is related to Weitzman (1974) who
compares the the benefit of controlling a system through quantities rather than prices when
production costs are uncertain. In the first case, quantities are fixed and prices adjust to
clear the market. In the second case, prices are fixed and quantity adjusts to clear the
market. Weitzman argued that control through quantities is superior to control via prices,
and the advantage of such control for the system scales with the variance of the (component
of the) production cost. Thus, higher production cost variance makes quantity control more
advantageous for the producer. Our results provide a complementary perspective: If the
buyer can choose to source from distinct supply chains that are quantity controlled, it may
prefer to source from the chain having higher output uncertainty. Consequently, while,
according to Weitzman (1974), higher cost variance encourages control through quantities,
our results suggest that competition among quantity controlled supply chains will increase
output uncertainty.
4.3.3. Retailers’ Welfare vs. Production Failure Retailers’ welfare suffers when λ is
close to 1 because a small number of failures among a retailer’s peers cannot result in
a large enough gap between upstream and downstream prices, to guarantee the retailer a
positive expected payoff. If we resort to the same simple supply chain example from the
discussion of link concentration behavior, with two retailers and two suppliers, the above
mentioned effect clearly manifests itself in Fig. 5 when we look at the dependency of a
retailer’s expected payoff upon productivity λ.
The non-monotonic dependence of a retailer’s expected payoff upon λ is valid only when
we vary reliability of every agent in the system. If we admit a heterogeneous environment,
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Figure 5 Dependency of a retailer’s expected payoff in a small supply chain in a network where both retailers
source from the same supplier and a network where they source from two different suppliers.
where every retailer and supplier i∈ Tt had its own reliability parameter λt,i, then, in the
model without congestion, from the point of view of retailer i ∈ T1, a perfect situation
would be if every retailer including i were linking to the most reliable supplier, i itself
would also have maximal λi, while its peers’ λi′ were minimal—this way, retailer i could
guarantee itself both a large product quantity to sell, and a large gap between upstream
and downstream prices.
5. Strategic Formation of Supply Chain Networks With Congestion
In this section, we extend the previous model by incorporating an congestion penalty,
modeling either limited supply or a delay in supply delivery—based upon the total product
quantity being produced by a supplier—and show that the congestion effect changes the
formed supply chains qualitatively.
5.1. Model
The payoff function (19) for each agent i ∈ Tt is an extension of the payoff function (14)
that incorporates a congestion penalty term Lt,i.
pit,i = St,i · pt︸ ︷︷ ︸
selling
downstream
− Rt,i · pt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
buying
upstream
− c · d+t,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
linking
cost
− Lt,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
congestion
penalty
, (19)
piT,i = ST,i · pT −RT,i · pT+1,
where
Lt,i =
1
d+t,i
∑
j∈N+t,i
`(St+1,j) =
1
d+t,i
∑
j∈N+t,i
γ
2
(St+1,j)
2. (20)
On can interpret the penalty as a soft constraint on supplies. Another way is to treat
it as a delay or latency in product delivery—the larger the amount of product being
in production at a supplier, the longer a retailer would wait, on average, for the deliv-
ery of goods by that supplier. The congestion function `(x) depends upon the amount
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of product actually produced by a supplier, though demand-dependent ` may also be a
viable option7. We use a specific congestion function `(x) = γ
2
x2 due to its simplicity and
strict convexity. The rationale for strict convexity is to model productivity deterioration in
higher-supply production (additionally and not surprisingly, a linear congestion function
would not encourage retailers to multi-source for the same reason the retailer does not
multi-source in Sec. 4.3.1).
Next, we update the expression for the expected payoff.
Proposition 3 (Retailer’s Expected Payoff in Model With Congestion). For
an active retailer i∈ T1,
E[pi1,i] = E[S1,i · p1−R1,i · p2− c · d+1,i−L1,i]
= λ(1− λ)D(λD((1 + λ)na1− λ)−∆) +
λD2
d+1,i
(
(1− λ)2− γ
2d+1,i
)
− cd+1,i +
λD2
d+1,i
∑
j∈N+1,i
F−i2,j
(
(1− λ)(1− λ2)− γ
d+1,i
− γ
2
F−i2,j
)
(21)
= λ(1− λ)D(λD((1 + λ)na1− λ)−∆) +
λD2
d+t,i
(1− λ)2− γ
2d+1,i
+
(
(1− λ)(1− λ2)− γ
d+1,i
)
ρ+1,i

− cd+1,i−
λD2γ
2d+1,i
∑
j∈N+1,i
(
F−i2,j
)2
. (22)
Here na1 ≤ n is the number of active retailers, having at least one out-link. ρ+1,i =∑
i′∈Ta1 {i} d
+
1,i′∩i / d
+
1,i′ =
∑
i′∈Ta1 {i} |N
+
1,i ∩N+1,i′| / d+1,i′ is the aggregate relative overlap of out-
neighborhoods of active retailers with the out-neighborhood of i, and F−i2,j =
∑
i′∈N−2,j {i} 1/d
+
1,i′
is the congestion at supplier j ∈ T2 excluding the contribution of retailer i ∈ T1. If retailer
i is inactive, then, d+1,i = 0 and E[pi1,i] = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3 The proof is easily obtained by substituting the congestion
penalty (20), the expression for supply (12), and the expected payoff for the model without
congestion given in Proposition 1 into the above expression for E[pi1,i]. 
5.2. Analysis of the Model With n= 2 and m= 2
In this section, we provide the analysis of the supply chain formation model with conges-
tion, described in Sec. 5.1 in the case of two tiers, having two retailers and two suppliers, as
illustrated in Fig. 6. More general results for the model with congestion appear in Sec. 5.3.
We will be interested in which of the networks shown in Fig. 7 are equilibrium networks.
The networks in Fig. 7 exhaust the set of equilibrium network candidates, up to agent
7 Dependency of the congestion function `(x) upon either the requested or produced amount of product is meaningful,
depending on when a requesting party learns about the upstream failure. For example, if a failure occurs due to a
natural disaster or a union strike—both of which are publicly observed—the congestion penalty would depend on the
amount delivered; if, however, a supplier reaches the deadline having not managed to produced any output and having
not timely informed its clients about it, then the congestion penalty’s dependency upon (non-realized) demand may
be more appropriate. We chose a supply-dependent congestion function ensure that, if an upstream supplier fails, a
retailer sourcing from that supplier does not incur additional penalties associated with the failed product delivery.
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Figure 6 A small two-tier supply chain with two retailers T1, |T1|= n= 2, and two suppliers T2, |T2|=m= 2.
The link that the retailers may create are displayed dashed.
(a) empty (b) cone (c) parallel (d) zee (e) full
Figure 7 Equilibrium network candidates. The empty network is always an equilibrium; other networks may be
equilibria (potentially, simultaneously) in different regions of the parameter space.
labeling: (i) an empty network is always an equilibrium for the same reason as in the case
of the model without congestion (see Theorem 1)—even in the absence of the congestion
penalty, it is strictly preferred to the networks that can be obtained from it via unilat-
eral deviations, so (ii) the latter networks where only one retailer has links cannot be an
equilibrium; (iii) the zee-shaped network is unique up to retailer labeling, and the cone
network is unique up to supplier labeling.
5.2.1. Payoffs We use Proposition 3 to compute a retailer’s expected payoff in the
candidate equilibrium networks.
Proposition 4 (Retailer’s Expected Payoff in 2x2 Candidate Networks).
Retailers have the following expected payoffs in each of the candidate networks from Fig. 7:
E[pi∗1,i
∣∣ ] = 0,
E[pi∗1,i
∣∣ ] = λ(λ3− 2λ2 + 1− 7
2
γ)D2− c,
E[pi∗1,i
∣∣ ] = λ(−λ3 + 2λ− 1− 1
2
γ)D2− c,
E[pi∗1,1
∣∣ ] = 1
2
λ(−λ3− λ2 + 3λ− 1− 9
4
γ)D2− c,
E[pi∗1,2
∣∣ ] = 1
2
λ(−λ3− 2λ2 + 5λ− 2− 5
4
γ)D2− 2c,
E[pi∗1,i
∣∣ ] = 1
2
λ(−λ3− 2λ2 + 5λ− 2− γ)D2− 2c.
where i ∈ {1,2}, λ ∈ (0,1) is the production success likelihood, D is the consumer demand
per retailer, and c and γ are the linking and the congestion costs, respectively.
Proof of Proposition 4 The expressions for the payoffs as functions of consumer demand
D per retailer are obtained directly by specializing expression (21) of a retailer’s expected
payoff from Proposition 3 to the case of 2 retailers and 2 suppliers. 
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5.2.2. Bounding Costs First, we determine the model parameters for which each of
the candidate networks yields non-negative expected payoffs for each retailer.
Proposition 5 (Retailer Network Feasibility). For each of the candidate net-
works, retailer i∈ {1,2}= T1 enjoys non-negative expected payoff only within the following
model parameter ranges: 
γ < γmaxcone =
2
7
(1− λ)(
√
5+1
2
− λ)(
√
5−1
2
+ λ),
λ ∈ (0,1),
c ≤ cmaxcone = λ(λ3− 2λ2 + 1− 72γ)D2;
γ < γmaxpara = 2(1− λ)(λ+
√
5+1
2
)(λ−
√
5−1
2
),
λ ∈ (
√
5−1
2
,1) = (λminpara,1),
c ≤ cmaxpara = λ(−λ3 + 2λ2− 1− 12γ)D2;
γ < γmaxzee-1 =
4
9
(1− λ)(λ+ (√2 + 1))(λ− (√2− 1)),
λ ∈ (√2− 1,1) = (λminzee-1,1),
c ≤ cmaxzee-1 = 12λ(−λ3− λ2 + 3λ− 1− 94γ)D2;
γ < γmaxzee-2 =
4
5
(1− λ)(λ+
√
17+3
2
)(λ−
√
17−3
2
),
λ ∈ (
√
17−3
2
,1) = (λminfull ,1),
c ≤ cmaxfull = 14λ(−λ3− 2λ2 + 5λ− 2− 54γ)D2;
γ < γmaxfull = (1− λ)(λ+
√
17+3
2
)(λ−
√
17−3
2
),
λ ∈ (
√
17−3
2
,1) = (λminzee ,1),
c ≤ cmaxzee-2 = 14λ(−λ3− 2λ2 + 5λ− 2− γ)D2;
Proof of Proposition 5 We verify the proposition for the cone network the proof for the
other networks is similar.
From Proposition 4, we have
E[pi∗1,i
∣∣ ] = λ(λ3− 2λ2 + 1− 7
2
γ)D2− c.
In this expression, if the coefficient of D2 is non-positive, then E[pi1,i
∣∣ ] < 0 because we
assumed that the consumer demand D per retailer is positive. In the latter case, the cone
network would not be a best response, as a retailer would prefer to drop its links, increasing
its expected payoffs to zero. Hence, for a retailer to get non-negative expected payoff, that
coefficient of D2 must be positive, resulting in
γ < 2
7
(λ3− 2λ2− 2λ+ 3) = 2
7
(1− λ)(
√
5+1
2
− λ)(
√
5−1
2
+ λ).
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(For the obtained upper bound to be well-defined, we don’t need additional restrictions
on λ∈ (0,1), though, in the proof for the other networks we must lower-bound λ to ensure
that the upper bound of γ is non-negative.)
Additionally, for the cone network to be an equilibrium candidate, we require E[pi∗1,i
∣∣ ]≥
0, resulting in the upper bound for c
c≤ λ(λ3− 2λ2 + 1− 7
2
γ)D2 = cmaxcone.

Similarly to how it was done for the model without congestion, we will assume that
the parameters of the model with congestion are such that the network with parallel links
is feasible, that is, the retailers are getting positive payoffs in such a network. The cost
bounds in the following assumption follow directly from Proposition 5.
Assumption 2 (Bounding Costs in 2x2 Model With Congestion). Assume that
the parameters of the supply chain network formation model with congestion are such,
that, if the number of suppliers were at least as large as the number of retailers, then, in
the network with parallel links, every retailer would have a positive expected payoff. From
Proposition 5, this assumption holds if
γ < γmaxpara = 2(1− λ)(λ+
√
5+1
2
)(λ−
√
5−1
2
) and λ>
√
5−1
2
= λminpara.
5.2.3. Nash Equilibria When γ > 0 and c = 0 In what follows, we analyze the small
supply chain network formation model with congestion assuming a negligible linking cost
c. For now, we focus on how different combinations of (λ, γ) affect retailers’ behavior.
In the light of Proposition 5 and Assumption 2, the relevant space of parameters is
depicted in Fig. 8. Due to Assumption 2, we are interested only in the part of the parameter
space under the curve γmaxpara.
In order to reason about when each of the candidate networks is an equilibrium, let
us outline the possible unilateral deviations in Fig. 9. From Theorem 1 we know that no
unilateral deviation from an empty network can provide a non-negative expected payoff to
a retailer, so the empty network is isolated in Fig. 9, and, hence, is always an equilibrium.
Other candidate networks may or may not be equilibria depending on which of them are
preferred by the retailers performing the corresponding unilateral deviations. These latter
preferences vary across the parameter space, as the following proposition establishes.
Proposition 6 (Retailers’ Preference Over Equilibrium Network Candidates).
Let us assume that linking cost c is negligibly small, and define
γ̂fz1 =
4
5
(1− λ)2, γ̂z2c = 423(1− λ)2(3λ+ 4), γ̂pc = 23(1− λ)2(λ+ 1), γ̂pz2 = λ(1− λ)2.
Then, for all λ∈ (
√
5−1
2
,1), γ̂fz1(λ)< γ̂z2c(λ)< γ̂pc(λ)< γ̂pz2(λ), and for the different ranges
of γ, retailers’ preferences over networks are as shown in Fig. 10, where Ai B indicates
that E[pi1,i
∣∣
A
] > E[pi1,i
∣∣
B
], that is, retailer i ∈ {1,2} strictly prefers network B to network
A, and there is a unilateral deviation via which i can switch between A and B. Non-strict
preference i is defined analogously.
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Figure 8 Parameter space for the model with congestion having 2 retailers and 2 suppliers. The feasibility
regions of each equilibrium candidate network (for zee-shaped network—from the points of view of both
retailers)—in which the corresponding retailers have positive expected payoffs—are enclosed between the
horizontal axis, strictly below the curve γmaxpara and the curve for the corresponding candidate network.
Figure 9 Possible unilateral deviations in a supply chain with 2 retailers and 2 suppliers. Links between
networks indicate a possibility of a unilateral deviation by the retailers whose indices label that link.
Figure 10 Retailers’ preferences over equilibrium network candidates for different congestion costs.
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Proof of Proposition 6 Expressions for γ̂fz1, γ̂z2c, γ̂pc, and γ̂pz2 are obtained by solving
equations E[pi1,i
∣∣ ] = E[pi1,1∣∣ ], E[pi1,2∣∣ ] = E[pi1,i∣∣ ], E[pi1,i∣∣ ] = E[pi1,i∣∣ ], and E[pi1,i∣∣ ] =
E[pi1,2
∣∣ ], respectively, under the assumption that linking cost c can be dropped. In these
equations, the expected payoffs are given in Proposition 5. The rest is straightforward. 
We, now, can augment the parameter space in Fig. 8 with the obtained thresholds γ̂.
The result is shown in Fig. 11.
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Figure 11 Parameter space for the model with congestion having 2 retailers and 2 suppliers. In addition to the
upper bounds on γ necessary for candidate network feasibility, we show thresholds γ̂ that affect the retailers’
preferences over equilibrium candidate networks.
Having information about both candidate network feasibility and retailers’ preference
over them in different regions of the parameter space, we can characterize equilibrium
networks, as we do in Theorem 4 and Fig. 12.
Theorem 4 (Equilibria in 2x2 Model With Congestion and c= 0). Assume
that the linking cost c is negligibly small, and γmax∗ and γ̂∗ are defined in Propositions 5
and Proposition 11, respectively. Then, in the supply chain network formation game with
congestion (Definition 1) with 2 retailers and 2 suppliers, the following holds for the pure
strategy Nash equilibria networks:
1. An empty network is always an equilibrium.
2. If
√
5−1
2
< λ< 1, and 0≤ γ < γmaxpara, and
(a) γ < γ̂fz1(λ), then the cone network is the unique non-empty equilibrium;
(b) γ̂fz1(λ) ≤ γ ≤ γ̂z2c(λ), then the cone and full networks are the only non-empty
equilibria;
(c) γ̂z2c(λ)<γ < γ̂pz2(λ), then the full networks is the unique non-empty equilibrium;
(d) γ ≥ γ̂pz2(λ), then the parallel and the full networks are the only non-empty equi-
libria.
3. If none of the above conditions is met, then the empty network is the only equilibrium.
Amelkin and Vohra: Strategic Formation and Reliability of Supply Chain Networks
28 (Working Paper, September 19, 2019)
Figure 12 Equilibria networks in different parts of the parameter space for the model with congestion with 2
retailers and 2 suppliers, and a negligible linking cost c≈ 0.
Proof of Theorem 4 To characterize equilibria networks in different parts of the model
parameter space—shown in Fig. 11—we will rely on Proposition 5 that provides us with
retailers’ expected payoffs in a best response as well as the conditions for when that payoff
is non-negative, as well as on Proposition 6 that establishes the retailers’ preference over
equilibrium network candidates.
According to Assumption 2, and Proposition 5 characterizing the necessary condition
for the assumption to hold, we are interested only in the region of the parameter space
strictly8 above the horizontal axis and strictly below curve γmaxpara (λ), which also implies a
lower bound on λ:
0< γ < 2(1− λ)(λ+
√
5+1
2
)(λ−
√
5−1
2
),
√
5−1
2
< λ< 1.
In the above defined region of the parameter space, we will focus on 5 parts that curves
γ̂fz1, γ̂z2c, γ̂pc, and γ̂pz2 slice the region into:
1) γ < γ̂fz1(λ): According to Proposition 5, all the non-empty candidate networks are
feasible here (the retailers are getting a non-negative payoff), and, based on Proposition 6,
the retailers’ preferences over networks are as follows:
2 , 1 , 1,2 , 2
The same relationships summarized as a diagram in Fig. 13. Thus, the only non-empty
network from which no retailer wants to unilaterally deviate is the cone network, making
it the unique non-empty equilibrium network up to supplier labeling.
2) γ̂fz1 ≤ γ ≤ γ̂z2c: Proceeding similarly to the previous case, we end up with the relation-
ships between the candidate networks shown in Fig. 14. While all networks are feasible,
8 The case γ = 0 corresponds to the model without congestion, which is the topic of study in Sec. 4.
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Figure 13 Retailers’ preference over networks when γ < γ̂fz1(λ). Ai B indicates that in network A, retailer i
has a strictly larger expected payoff than in network B. Each network is feasible (retailers have non-negative
expected payoffs in each of them). The cone network is an equilibrium.
Figure 14 Retailers’ preference over networks when γ̂fz1(λ)≤ γ ≤ γ̂z2c(λ). Ai B indicates that in network A,
retailer i has a strictly larger expected payoff than in network B, and A<i B allows for expected payoff equality.
Among the two <i relationships, equality can hold only for one of them at a time. All networks are feasible, and
the cone and full networks are equilibria.
only in the cone and the full networks, retailers prefer not to unilaterally deviate. Notice
that, out of two non-strict preference relations— <2 and <1 —equivalence
can hold in one of them at a time (either when γ = γ̂fz1(λ) or when γ = γ̂z2c(λ), which
cannot hold simultaneously in λ ∈ (
√
5−1
2
,1)), which is why zee-shaped network is not an
equilibrium.
3) γ̂z2c(λ)< γ < γ̂pz2(λ): The retailers’ preferences over the candidate networks are shown
in Fig. 15. Here, the feasibility of networks varies across the region, and the cone network’s
relationship with the parallel network also varies. However, this does not affect the full
network’s being the only non-empty equilibrium in this region of the parameter space.
4) γ̂pz2(λ)≤ γ < γmaxpara (λ): In the last slice of the parameter space partition, the retailers’
preferences over the candidate networks are shown in Fig. 16. Here, the parallel and the
full network are the only non-empty equilibria.

5.2.4. Nash Equilibria When γ > 0 and c > 0 In this section, we characterize equilib-
rium networks when c > 0. The qualitative changes in the parameter space partitioning are
depicted in Fig. 17. It is easy to see that the introduction of positive linking cost c results
in a shift of curves γ̂z2c(λ) and γ̂pz2(λ). However, there are two critical things to notice:
(i) all such curves intersect at the same point, whose location in the parameter space is
described in Fig. 18; and
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Figure 15 Retailers’ preference over networks when γ̂z2c(λ)< γ < γ̂pz2(λ). The retailers’ expected payoffs are
non-negative in the cone network only in the part of the region, and so is the expected payoff of retailer 1 in the
zee-shaped network; also the relationship between the cone and the parallel networks change within the region.
Figure 16 Retailers’ preference over networks when γ̂pz2(λ)≤ γ < γmaxpara (λ). Feasibility of zee and cone networks
varies across the region. Parallel and full networks are unique non-empty equilibria.
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(b) c > 0
Figure 17 Parameter space of the model with congestion with two retailers and suppliers, with zero and
positive linking cost.
(ii) the order of the curves γ̂ on each side of that intersection point is the same, regardless
of the value of c.
Thus, following the reasoning from the proof of Theorem 4, it is easy to generalize the
latter’s statement to the case of positive linking cost c. To aid understanding, we provide
this generalization here informally: Fig. 19 shows how equilibrium networks change when
the linking cost c is positive but not large.
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Figure 18 The location of the intersection point of the curves γ̂fz1(λ, c), γ̂z2c(λ, c), γ̂pc(λ, c), and γ̂pz2(λ, c).
Figure 19 Equilibrium networks in different parts of the parameter space for the model with congestion having
2 retailers and 2 suppliers, and a small positive linking cost c.
Besides γ̂ curves’ shifting with growing c, the network feasibility regions—outlined by
curves γmax—shrink, and the feasibility regions of denser networks (only the full network
for the case of 2 retailers and suppliers) shrink faster than those of sparser networks. As a
result, when c grows further, the equilibria network distribution over the parameter space
changes as shown in Fig. 20.
As c grows even larger, first, the island region in which the full network is an equilibrium
gradually disappears; then the region where the parallel network is feasible shrinks to a
point (it does not disappear because of Assumption 2).
We conclude the discussion of the model with 2 retailers and suppliers with Table 3
showing the values of expected payoff of a retailer at equilibrium for the candidate networks
when the linking cost c grows. We see that the positive values of the expected payoffs
outline the earlier defined regions within which different networks may be equilibria.
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Figure 20 Equilibria networks in different parts of the parameter space for the model with congestion having 2
retailers and 2 suppliers, and a positive linking cost c of larger magnitude.
5.3. Analysis of the General Model
In this section, we will provide a limited set of theoretical results for the general model
with congestion defined in Sec. 5.1, putting no constraints on the number of retailers and
suppliers. These results will be proved under the following assumptions.
Assumption 3 (Cost Magnitude in General Model). Let us assume that the link-
ing cost c and the congestion cost γ in the general model with congestion are not too high,
so that
1. every retailer can be active—having d+1,i > 0 and E[pi1,i]> 0; and
2. there is a positive value of consumer demand D per supplier, under which the retailers
have non-negative expected payoffs E[pi1,i]≥ 0.
The second item in Assumption 3 states that there is a network in which retailers enjoy
non-negative profit. The first item in the assumption restricts attention to those networks
where every retailer links to some suppliers (there may be equilibria networks in which
some retailers have no links).
First, let us define
d̂+1,i =
λ(1− λ)D√
c
, (23)
F̂−i2,j = max
{
0,
(1− λ)(1− λ2)
γ
− 1
d+1,i
}
, (24)
and assume that d̂+1,i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Theorem 5 (Equilibria in Low Congestion Cost Regime). Given that Assump-
tion 3 holds, in a low congestion cost regime, when
γ <
(1− λ)(1− λ2)
n
the behavior of the general model with congestion is qualitatively identical to that of the
model without congestion—characterized earlier in Theorem 3—so there is only one unique
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Table 3 Expected payoff E[pi∗1,i|•] of a retailer at equilibrium when linking cost c varies, and the consumer
demand per retailer is normalized to D= 1. The 0 values in these figures indicate that the corresponding network
is not an equilibrium for the given combination of model parameter values (λ, c, γ).
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(up to supplier labeling) non-empty equilibrium network where every retailer maintains a
single link, and all the retailers source from the same supplier.
Theorem 6 (Symmetric Equilibrium in Higher Congestion Cost Regime).
Given that Assumption 3 holds, in a high congestion cost regime, where, from the
perspective of every retailer i, the congestion at every supplier F−i2,j can reach F̂
−i
2,j , let
us ignore parity and divisibility issues and assume existence of a regular network, in
which all retailers have out-degree d+1,i = d̂
+
1,i, all the congestion at every supplier is
F̂−i2,j |d+1,i=d̂+1,i. Then, this network is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the general model
with congestion.
Proof of Theorems 5 and 6 From (21), we have the expression for the expected payoff
of a retailer in the general model with congestion
E[pi1,i] =λ(1− λ)D(λD((1 + λ)na1− λ)−∆) +
λD2
d+1,i
(
(1− λ)2− γ
2d+1,i
)
− cd+1,i +
λD2
d+1,i
∑
j∈N+1,i
F−i2,j
(
(1− λ)(1− λ2)− γ
d+1,i
− γ
2
F−i2,j
)
.
From Assumption 3, we know that at an equilibrium, na1 = n.
1) Low congestion cost regime: Based on the above expression for E[pi1,i], when a best-
responding retailer i decides which d+1,i suppliers to link to, it assesses each supplier with
respect to the value of
f(F−i2,j ) = F
−i
2,j
(
(1− λ)(1− λ2)− γ
d+1,i
− γ
2
F−i2,j
)
,
which is retailer dependent. f(F−i2,j ) is a quadratic function, reaching its maximal value on
F−i2,j ∈ R+ at
F−i2,j = F̂
−i
2,j = max
{
0,
(1− λ)(1− λ2)
γ
− 1
d+1,i
}
.
In a low congestion regime, when γ < (1−λ)(1−λ
2)
n
, for any retailer i and supplier j, F̂−i2,j >
n− 1
d+1,i
≥ n− 1 is so large, that
F−i2,j < F̂
−i
2,j .
Taking into account that, under the same constraint imposed upon γ, the following term
in the expected payoff expression is non-negative
(1− λ)2− γ
2d+1,i
> (1− λ)2− (1− λ)(1− λ
2)
2nd+1,i
= (1− λ)2
[
1− 1 + λ
2nd+1,i
]
≥ 0,
we see that congestion in the low congestion cost regime is unambiguously good from the
perspective of a retailer, and the latter also has no incentive to create more than one link
as the expected payoff is a decreasing function of d+1,i. As a result, the behavior of the
model is the same as that of the model without congestion, as described in Theorem 3.
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2) Higher congestion cost regime: In this regime, and unlike the previous case of low γ,
congestion F−i2,j at every supplier can actually reach its optimal value F̂
−i
2,j . Let us consider
the network in which retailers have identical out-degrees d+1,i = τ ≥ 1, and suppliers have
identical congestion values F−i2,j = F̂
−i
2,j . This network’s existence is assumed in Theorem 6.
In this network, in terms of retailers’ link distribution over suppliers, the retailers are best-
responding, as all the suppliers have identical value f(F−i2,j ), and it does not matter which
d+1,i of them to link to. Thus, we are interested in the question of whether any retailer would
like to unilaterally change its outdegree d+1,i improving its expected payoff. Let us pick the
best possible out-degree from which a retailer would not have an incentive to deviate.
E[pi1,i]|F−i2,j=F̂−i2,j
d+1,i−−→max .
The considered objective function, as a function of d+1,i, reaches its maximum at
d+1,i = d̂
+
1,i =
λ(1− λ)D√
c
.
If ∀i ∈ T1 : d+1,i = d̂+1,i and ∀i ∈ T1, j ∈ T2 : F−i2,j = F̂−i2,j , does a retailer i have an incentive to
unilaterally deviate? If it decides to reduce its outdegree d+1,i, then no changes happen to
i’s preferences on which suppliers to link to, as its F̂−i2,j decreased, and by simply dropping
any of existing links it is already doing its best at reducing congestion F−i2,j at its suppliers.
Hence, as d+1,i is already at its optimal value, a link drop cannot improve i’s expected
payoff. Similarly, if we consider link addition, it does not matter whom to create an extra
link to, as all the suppliers have the same value, and a retailer’s out-degree is already at
its optimal value. Thus, the considered network is an equilibrium.

We list several observations obtained from computing equilibria in specific instances of
the general model with congestion:
• We conjecture that, under moderate linking and congestion costs, a non-empty equi-
librium network always exists.
• There are irregular equilibrium networks (not left- or right-regular).
• In some equilibrium networks, a fraction of retailers have no links.
• While the symmetric equilibrium network of Theorem 6 need not exist in general, we
often observe existence of an equilibrium network structurally similar to it.
5.4. Supplier Heterogeneity and Incentives for Reliability Improvement
The general model with congestion assumed a homogeneous set of suppliers, having identi-
cal production success likelihoods λi = λ and congestion costs γi = γ. Here we are interested
in whether suppliers are incentivized to invest in improving their reliability through either
reducing their congestion costs γi or increasing their production success likelihood λi. Fur-
thermore, if there are two options for a supplier—either to invest in production reliability,
or to invest congestion reduction—which should they pick?
Theorem 7 (Investment in Quality by Heterogeneous Strategic Suppliers).
Assume that the linking and congestion costs are moderate, so that non-empty equilibria
exist. Then, the following holds in our two-tier models:
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1. Absent congestion, suppliers are always incentivized to maximize their production suc-
cess likelihood λi.
2. With congestion, a reduction in congestion cost γi is unambiguously good for supplier
i, increasing its production success likelihood λi is not always profitable—retailers may
prefer to source from suppliers that are less likely to succeed in production.
Proof of Theorem 7 Let us, now, extend the general model with congestion with het-
erogeneous reliability parameters. Since we are mostly interested in the strategic behavior
of suppliers competing for retailers, we will assume that retailers are all equally reliable,
having the likelihood of production success λ1,i = λr for all i ∈ T1. Reliability of suppliers,
however, varies: supplier j ∈ T2 has production success likelihood λ2,j = λj, and congestion
cost γ2,j = γj.
First, we must modify the expected payoffs of the general model with congestion to this
environment.
1) Payoffs: The general expressions (19) for agent payoff still holds in the heterogeneous
model:
pi1,i = S1,ip1−R1,ip2− cd+1,i−L1,i,
pi2,j = S2,jp2−R2,jp3,
where, as before, St,i is the supply of i∈ Tt, Rt,i is the same agent’s realized demand, pt is
the price at which tier t trades product downstream, and
L1,i =
1
d+1,i
∑
j∈N+1,i
γ
2
(S2,j)
2
is the penalty incurred by agent i∈ Tt due to congestion at the upstream suppliers N+t,i it is
linked to. Notice that, as suppliers in T2 do not strategically create links—all of them are
assumed to have access to the raw material market—they do not suffer penalties associated
with linking or upstream congestion.
Now, we need to derive expected payoffs. This derivation will go along the lines of the
proof of Proposition 3, with the difference that, suppliers are heterogeneous.
E[pi1,i] = E[S1,ip1−R1,ip2− cd+1,i−L1,i] = (from proof of Proposition 3)
= E
[
R1,i
( ∑
i′∈Ta1
(1−ω1,iω1,i′)R1,i′ − (1−ω1,i∆
)− cd+1,i−L1,i].
At first, focus on the terms other than the congestion penalty L1,i; we deal with the later
in the last part of the proof.
E[R1,i] = (from (10)) = E
[
D
e+1,i
d+1,i
]
= E
[
D
∑
j∈N+1,i ω2,j
d+1,i
]
=
D
d+1,i
∑
j∈N+1,i
E[ω2,j] =
D
d+1,i
∑
j∈N+1,i
λj =
D
d+1,i
λ+1,i =Dλ
+
1,i,
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where
λ+1,i =
∑
j∈N+1,i
λj and λ
+
1,i =
λ+1,i
d+1,i
.
Within the scope of this proof, we will be using some extra notation to handle supplier het-
erogeneity; in this notation, the plus superscript indicates relation to the out-neighborhood
of an agent specified in the subscript, while the bar indicates averaging over that out-
neighborhood.
E[R1,iR1,i′] = (from (10)) = E
[(
D
e+1,i
d+1,i
)(
D
e+1,i′
d+1,i′
)]
=
D2
d+1,id
+
1,i′
E
[( ∑
j∈N+1,i
ω2,j
)( ∑
j′∈N+
1,i′
ω2,j′
)]
=
D2
d+1,id
+
1,i′
( ∑
j∈N+1,i
∑
j′∈N+
1,i′
E[ω2,j]E[ω2,j′] +
∑
j∈N+
1,i′∩N
+
1,i′
Var[ω2,j]
)
=
D2
d+1,id
+
1,i′
( ∑
j∈N+1,i
∑
j′∈N+
1,i′
λjλj′ +
∑
j∈N+
1,i′∩N
+
1,i′
λj(1− λj)
)
=D2
(∑
j∈N+1,i λj
d+1,i
·
∑
j′∈N+
1,i′
λ′j
d+1,i′
+
∑
j∈N+
1,i′∩N
+
1,i′
λj(1− λj)
d+1,id
+
1,i′
)
=D2
(
λ
+
1,iλ
+
1,i′ +σ
+
1,i∩i′
)
,
where
σ+1,i∩i′ =
∑
j∈N+
1,i′∩N
+
1,i′
λj(1− λj)
d+1,id
+
1,i′
.
Substituting the obtained expressions involving realized demands into the expression for
the expected payoff of a retailer, we end up with
E[pi1,i] = E
[
R1,i
( ∑
i′∈Ta1
(1−ω1,iω1,i′)R1,i′ − (1−ω1,i∆
)− cd+1,i−L1,i]
=
∑
i′∈Ta1
(1−E[ω1,i]E[ω1,i′ ])E[R1,iR1,i′ ]−∆(1−E[ω1,i])E[R1,i]− cd+1,i−E[L1,i]
=D2(1− λ2r)
∑
i′∈Ta1
(λ
+
1,iλ
+
1,i′ +σ
+
1,i∩i′)−∆(1− λr)Dλ
+
1,i− cd+1,i−E[L1,i].
The expected payoff E[pi2,j] of a supplier has the following form:
E[pi2,j] = E[S2,jp2−R2,jp3] = E[ω2,jR2,j(∆−S2)−R2,j(∆−S3)]
= (as raw material production never fails)
= E[ω2,jD2,j(∆−
∑
j′∈Ta2
S2,j′)−D2,j(∆−na1D)]
=D2,j E[ω2,j(∆−
∑
j′∈Ta2
ω2,j′D2,j′)− (∆−na1D)]
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=D2,j
(
λj(∆−D2,j −
∑
j′∈Ta2 {j}
λj′D2,j′)− (∆−na1D)
)
.
Now, we use the obtained expected payoffs to analyze the behavior of retailers and
suppliers, first, in the model without congestion, and, then, with congestion.
2) Supplier Behavior Without Congestion: Expected payoff of a retailer without conges-
tion is
E[pi1,i] =D
2(1− λ2r)
∑
i′∈Ta1
(λ
+
1,iλ
+
1,i′ +σ
+
1,i∩i′)−∆(1− λr)Dλ
+
1,i− cd+1,i.
From the above expression and the definition of
σ+1,i∩i′ =
∑
j∈N+
1,i′∩N
+
1,i′
λj(1− λj)
d+1,id
+
1,i′
,
it is clear that the link concentration behavior by retailers in the model without congestion
transfers persists with heterogeneous suppliers. Thus, at an equilibrium, there will be only
one supplier, say s∈ T2, to which all the active retailers link. Thus, at an equilibrium,
λ
+
1,i =
λ+1,i
d+1,i
= λ+1,i =
∑
j∈N+1,i
λj = λs and σ
+
1,i′∩i = λs(1− λs).
We can also repeat the reasoning from the analysis of equilibria for the model without
congestion, and conclude that, at an equilibrium,
E[pi1,i] =D
2(1− λ2r)
∑
i′∈Ta1
(λ
+
1,iλ
+
1,i′ +σ
+
1,i∩i′)−∆(1− λr)Dλ
+
1,i− cd+1,i
=D2(1− λ2r)
∑
i′∈Ta1
(λ2s + λs(1− λs))−∆(1− λr)Dλs− c
=D2(1− λ2r)na1λs−nD(1− λr)Dλs− c
=D2(1− λr)(na1(1 + λr)−n)λs− c.
As we assumed that non-empty equilibria exist, the factor in front of λs in the obtained
expression must be non-negative. Hence, a best-responding retailer maximizes λs.
At the same time, at the equilibrium where retailers concentrate links, supplier expected
payoff is
E[pi1,j] =D2,j(λj(∆−D2,j)− (∆−na1D))
if j = s and E[pi1,j] = 0 otherwise. Notice that, generally, ∆ > D2,j, so, unsurprisingly,
suppliers are incentivized to attract more demand from retailers.
Consequently, if suppliers are strategic about choosing their production success likeli-
hoods λj, and taking into account that, in the absence of congestion, only one supplier
gets links, suppliers are unconditionally incentivized to maximize their reliability to get a
positive expected payoff.
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3) Supplier Behavior With Congestion: To analyze the model with congestion, let us,
first, update the corresponding expression for the expected retailer payoff, and, in partic-
ular, get the expected value of the congestion penalty.
L1,i =
1
d+1,i
∑
j∈N+1,i
γ
2
(S2,j)
2, E[L1,i] =
γ
2d+1,i
∑
j∈N+1,i
λj(D2,j)
2 =
γD2
2d+1,i
∑
j∈N+1,i
λj(F2,j)
2,
where F2,j =
∑
i′∈N−2,j 1/d
+
1,i′ describes how congested supplier j ∈ T2 is. Consequently, a
retailer’s expected payoff in the model with congestion and heterogeneous suppliers is
E[pi1,i] =D
2(1− λ2r)
∑
i′∈Ta1
(λ
+
1,iλ
+
1,i′ +σ
+
1,i∩i′)−∆(1− λr)Dλ
+
1,i− cd+1,i−
γD2
2d+1,i
∑
j∈N+1,i
λj(F2,j)
2.
Already from the expression above we can see that, now, a retailer, besides aiming at
picking reliable suppliers due to the first two summands in the expected payoff expression,
may avoid linking to highly reliable suppliers, as the corresponding large λj would increase
the congestion penalty—the last term in the expected payoff.
To get a better feeling for why retailers may prefer lower-reliability suppliers, let us look
at two specific equilibria that we have already encountered.
First, let us inspect the symmetric equilibrium of Theorem 6. In it,
d+1,i = τ, d
−
2,j = nτ/m, F2,j =
∑
i′∈N−2,j
1/d+1,i′ = n/m, λ
+
1,i = λ
+
1,i/τ.
Consequently, again, assuming that every retailer is active, that is, na1 = n,
E[pi1,i] =D
2
∑
i′∈T1
(
λ
+
1,i
(
(1− λ2r)λ
+
1,i′ − (1− λr)−
γn
2m2
)
+ (1− λ2r)σ+1,i∩i′
)
− cτ.
Notice that, in the obtained expression, the factor next to λ
+
1,i can be positive or negative,
depending on the balance between the sizes of supplier and retailer sets, as well as the
congestion penalty value. If this is the case, the first summand under the sum would be
such that a best-responding retailer would choose lower-reliability suppliers to lower its
λ
+
1,i—the average reliability over the suppliers retailer i is linking to. Another term under
the sum, involving σ+1,i∩i′ would still drive the retailers to link to “mid-reliability” suppliers.
Thus, the retailers would be driven to link to a few suppliers having an intermediate value
of production success likelihood λj.
Secondly, let us investigate a simpler equilibrium of Sec. 5.2, when n = m = 2, and in
the network, every retailer maintains a single link, sourcing from a separate supplier (a
network with parallel links). In that network, assuming, w.l.o.g., that retailer i ∈ T1 links
to supplier i∈ T2,
d+1,i = 1, d
−
2,j = 1, F2,j = 1, λ
+
1,i = λi, σ
+
1,i = λi(1− λi),
which gives
E[pi1,i] =D
2
[− (1− λ2r)λ2i + ((1− λ2r)(λ1 + λ2 + 1)− 2(1− λr)− γ/2)λi]− c.
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Expected payoff is a quadratic function, whose maximum in λi is attained at
λ̂i = λ1 + λ2 + 1− 2
1 + λr
− γ
2(1− λ2r)
.
In general, it is possible that λ̂i ∈ (0,1), in which case, suppliers would compete to drive
their reliability λi towards an intermediate value.
Hence, in the model with congestion, suppliers may not be incentivized to improve their
production reliability λi. At the same time, however, it is clear from the expression for the
expected payoff of a retailer that improvement of the congestion cost γi is unambiguously
good and lets the corresponding supplier attract more demand (links).

Theorem 7 confirms something intuitive—there is no reason why reduction of congestion
cost γj can hurt a supplier. Indeed, reduction of delays in order fulfillment unequivocally
makes the corresponding supplier more attractive for retailers, boosting the supplier’s
demand and, consequently, payoff. Alternatively, if we interpret the congestion penalty as
a soft cap on supply, then it is unsurprising that suppliers prefer higher supply caps.
Surprisingly, higher production reliability, can actually harm a supplier. The intuition for
why this happens is as follows. In a model with congestion, there are two competing forces
present. One, coming from the base model without congestion, drives the retailers towards
link concentration to secure better upstream prices. Another force, present in the form of
the explicit congestion penalty term in the retailer’s payoff in the model with congestion,
drives the retailers towards diversifying and spreading their supplier bases to avoid con-
gestion or long waits for their order fulfillment. When both these forces are present, their
balance results in some optimal value of congestion for the retailers, and to approach that
optimal congestion, the retailers are incentivized to link to “medium congestion” suppliers.
Such suppliers are characterized by lower demand or lower production success likelihood.
In the light of Theorem 7, we can conclude that, despite the seeming similarity between
production failures and production delays, these two types of failures are qualitatively
different.
5.5. Discussion of the Model With Congestion
The model with congestion (Sec. 4.1) was obtained by extending the model in (Sec 5.1).
Being an extension, the model with congestion inherited the retailers’ drive towards creat-
ing sparse networks (as they are cheap from the linking cost perspective) are concentrating
links (as it allows retailers to attain better upstream prices). However, the congestion
penalty introduces a countervailing force, that drives the retailers to create redundant links
and spread them to achieve a certain optimal supplier overlap with their peers.
While the equilibrium networks of the model without congestion—where agents concen-
trate links—are absent in the supply chain literature, the equilibrium networks of the model
with congestion: sparse networks possessing a sufficient amount of redundancy—and, in
particular, the symmetric equilibrium network of Theorem 6—resemble k-partite graph
expanders, which have been argued to form resilient supply chains Chou et al. (2011).
However, unlike this latter work, where the network structure was exogenously imposed,
our resilient networks are endogenously formed by the agents in an uncoordinated fashion.
It is also surprising that, in a heterogeneous environment, according to Theorem 7,
suppliers may not want to improve their production reliability, while always being willing
to improve their production delays via reducing congestion costs. This behavior also stems
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from the balance between two forces present in the system—network sparsification and
link concentration versus redundancy creation.
6. Conclusion
This paper introduced a model of strategic formation of supply chain network in the pres-
ence of yield uncertainty and congestion. We use it to derive three conclusions. First, in the
absence of congestion, retailers tend to create very sparse networks and concentrate links,
which results in chain-like multi-tier networks. Sparsity is the result of unconstrained sup-
plies, while link concentration lets retailers secure lower prices at the high yield upstream.
In the presence of congestion, retailers tend to form expander-like networks, which are
sparse, yet possessing sufficient redundancy. Finally, we show the qualitative difference
between yield uncertainty and congestion failures in an environment with heterogeneous
strategic suppliers: reducing congestion costs is unambiguously beneficial. Improving pro-
duction reliability, however, is beneficial only in the absence of congestion. In the presence
of congestion making production process more reliable can actually hurt a supplier. That
is, there can be too much production reliability in a supply chain.
In this paper, we focused on multi-sourcing as the primary device for mitigating produc-
tion disruptions. Others focus on varying ordered quantities to tackle uncertainty. Com-
bining the two in one model is an important direction for future research. We hypothesize
that the incorporation of strategic order quantity setting will not qualitatively change net-
work formation outcomes in the absence of congestion. Another extension is to consider
alternative price formation mechanisms.
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